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For the purposes of federal habeas relief, can the
adequacy of a state procedural rule hinge upon whether
the rule is discretionary rather than mandatory?
Facts:
Joesph Kindler was convicted of first degree
murder in a Pennsylvania state court and sentenced to
death.  Kindler appealed his sentence, but then escaped
from prison before the judge could rule on the appeal.
Kindler was captured in Quebec, but shortly thereafter,
he escaped a second time and was recaptured.  Five
years later, Kindler sought reinstatement of his post-ver-
dict appeal, but the court denied the appeal, holding that
Kindler had waived his right to appeal his conviction
because he fled prison.  The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed the ruling. In 1999, Kindler filed and was
denied a habeas petition in federal district court. On ap-
peal, the Third Circuit found that Pennsylvania’s fugi-
tive-forfeiture rule, which allowed for judicial
discretion, was inadequate to bar federal review.  Penn-
sylvania appealed to the Supreme Court.
decision:
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
held that “a discretionary state procedural rule can serve
as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas review.
Nothing inherent in such a rule renders it inadequate for
purposes of the adequate state ground doctrine.”  The
Court noted that this decision should not provide broad
guidance on the “adequate state ground doctrine,” not
ing that “[i]f our holding in this case is narrow, it is be-
cause the question we granted certiorari to decide is nar-
row.”
558 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: November 2009
question Presented:
For purposes of Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), should defense counsel’s performance
be reviewed under professional standards that existed at
the time of trial, as the majority of circuits require, or
the under the current professional standards?
Facts:
Robert van Hook was convicted of aggravated
murder with one capital specification and aggravated
robbery.  van Hook picked up David Self at a bar and
the two went to Self’s apartment where van Hook lured
Self into a vulnerable position, strangled him until he
was unconscious, and then killed him with a kitchen
knife. 
At the sentencing hearing, the defense called
eight mitigation witnesses, and van Hook himself gave
an unsworn statement. Defense counsel prepared the
witnesses before the indictment, trial, and sentencing.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted
van Hook relief, holding that van Hook’s attorneys per-
formed deficiently in investigating and presenting mit-
igating evidence at his sentencing.
decision:
The Supreme Court held that the defense attor-
ney acted reasonably.  Citing the holding from Strick-
land, that representation must not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevail-
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ing professional norms, the Court concluded that the
Sixth Circuit erred in relying on ABA guidelines estab-
lished 18 years after van Hook’s trial.  The Court stated
that the Constitution has never required that defense
counsel fully comply with statutory mandates. Although
states are free to impose rules to ensure appropriate rep-
resentation, the Court held that such rules should be re-
garded as evidence of what a reasonable diligent lawyer
should do, rather than what a reasonable lawyer is re-
quired to do.  Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
attorney’s investigation was reasonable and van Hook
was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel.
556 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: April 2009
question Presented:
Does federal law permit the suppression of a
voluntary confession made more than six hours after ar-
rest but before presentment to a magistrate, as a conse-
quence of unreasonable delay in presentment?
Facts:
Johnnie Corley was suspected of robbing a bank
in Norristown, Pennsylvania.  Federal agents went to ar-
rest Corley and found him attempting to escape in his
car.  Corley nearly ran-over one officer and pushed
down another.   At 8:00 a.m., the agents arrested Corley
for assaulting federal officers. 
Federal agents kept Corley at a local police sta-
tion while they questioned witnesses.  At 11:45 a.m., the
agents took Corley to the hospital to treat minor cuts he
sustained during the arrest.  Agents then took Corley to
the Philadelphia FBI office at 3:30 p.m. and held him
there until 6:30 p.m.  The federal agents then asked Cor-
ley to put an alleged oral confession in writing.  How-
ever, Corley told the agents he felt tired, so the agents
held him overnight.  The interrogation resumed at 10:30
a.m. the next morning, concluding with Corley signing
a written confession.  At 1:30 p.m., 29.5 hours after his
arrest, police presented Corley to a magistrate who
charged him with armed robbery and several other re-
lated charges.  Corley moved to suppress the confession.
The District Court denied his motion to suppress
under Rule 5(a), finding no unreasonable delay since
Corley asked for a break and had to be taken to the hos-
pital.  The Third Circuit affirmed the ruling, holding that
18 U.S.C. § 3501 abrogated the McNabb-Mallory doc-
trine, which makes confessions inadmissible if they are
obtained during an unreasonably long period of deten-
tion between the arrest and preliminary hearing.  The
Third Circuit ruled that under § 3501, confessions are
admissible and voluntary after considering the points
listed in § 3501(b), even if the presentment delay was
unreasonable. 
decision: 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the Third Circuit’s decision and held that
§ 3501 only limits McNabb-Mallory rather than total ab-
rogation.  The Court ruled that the McNabb-Mallory
doctrine still makes voluntary confessions inadmissible
when they are given after an unreasonable delay.  The
Court clarified that  § 3501(a) can only be interpreted
to mean that all voluntary confessions are admissible as
evidence, except when the confession is made after an
unreasonable delay in presenting the defendant to the
magistrate.  In so ruling, the Court relied upon §
3501(c), which prevents a confession from being “inad-
missible solely because of delay” when the confession
is (1) voluntary and (2) made within six hours of arrest.
The Court stated that holding otherwise would make
subsection (c) superfluous. 
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Jr., Justices Scalia, and Thomas dissented, arguing that
the language found in § 3501(a) unambiguously makes
confessions admissible if they are voluntarily given.
557 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: June 2009
question Presented:
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, is a defendant enti-
tled access to a state’s biological evidence following
conviction?
Facts:
In March 1994, William Osborne was convicted
of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault for  forcing
the victim to perform several sex acts, choking her, beat-
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District Attorney’s Office for the Third
District v. Osborne
ing her with his gun and handle of a wooden axe, and
shooting her in the head.  After his conviction, Osborne
requested the DNA evidence the state used against him.
Osborne wanted to use new DNA testing technology to
show that he was not the source  The state denied Os-
borne’s request, and upon denial, Osborne filed suit pur-
suant to § 1983 claiming the District Attorney’s Office
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
by refusing to provide potentially exculpatory evidence. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the
district court’s denial of Osborne’s motion. 
decision: 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that
access to such DNA evidence, after Osborne was con-
victed in a fair trial, is not a constitutional right, but
rather an issue for the states and the federal government
to legislate.  The Court pronounced that the appropriate
test is the Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) test,
which asks whether the state’s post-conviction proce-
dures for relief offend a principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental, or transgresses any recognized
principle of fundamental fairness in operation.
Applying Brady, the Court found the state’s
post-conviction relief procedures to be adequate.  The
state allows individuals the right to be released when the
evidence is sufficiently compelling in establishing inno-
cence and allows for discovery in post-conviction pro-
ceedings, including access to DNA.  There was ample
evidence, aside from the DNA evidence, that Osborne
committed the crime.
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion joined by
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Souter
joined in part, arguing that the Court’s prior decisions
and implementation of DNA access laws across the
country make judicial intervention more, not less, ap-
propriate.
556 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: May 2009
question Presented:
Can an individual, who used false identification
in the commission of a crime but was unaware that it
belonged to another person, be convicted of “aggravated
identity theft” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)?
Facts:
In 2000, Ignacio Flores-Figueroa secured employ-
ment using a false name, birth date, Social Security
number, and a counterfeit alien registration card.  Flo-
res-Figueroa is a citizen of Mexico.  In 2006, Flores-
Figueroa provided his employer with more counterfeit
documents that used his real name, but he was unaware
that the documentation was legally registered to other
people.  The government charged Flores with entering
the United States without inspection, misusing immi-
gration documents, and aggravated identity theft.  Flo-
res-Figueroa was convicted on two counts of aggravated
identity theft in a federal district court and sentenced to
75 months imprisonment. 
Flores-Figueroa appealed the conviction, contend-
ing that the aggravated identify theft offense required he
have knowledge that the identification belonged to an-
other individual.  The Eighth Circuit rejected the argu-
ment and affirmed the trial court’s decision.
decision: 
The Supreme Court concluded that §
1028A(a)(1) requires the government to prove that the
defendant knew that the means of identification he un-
lawfully transferred, possessed, or used, belonged to a
real person.  Applying the rules of statutory construc-
tion, the Court explained that phrases in a criminal
statute that introduce the elements of a crime with the
word “knowingly,” must be read as applying “know-
ingly” to each element. In this case, because Flores-
Figueroa did not know the information belonged to
another, the government did not meet its burden of
showing that Flores-Figueroa knowingly violated the
statute.  The Court reversed and remanded. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote
a separate concurring opinion, expressing that a mens
rea or “knowingly” requirement should not ordinarily
be read into criminal statutes, especially when the statute
is carefully constructed to limit or eliminate a mens rea
requirement.
Justice Alito also wrote a separate concurrence,
noting that he was concerned that the Court’s ruling
would be read as applying an overly-rigid rule of statu-
tory construction.
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Knowles v. Mirzayance
556 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: March 2009
question Presented:
Does a defense counsel’s recommendation to
abandon an insanity defense constitute ineffective assis-
tance of counsel for the purpose of federal habeas law?
Facts:
Alex Mirzayance confessed to murdering his 19-
year-old cousin by stabbing her nine times with a hunt-
ing knife and then shooting her four times.  At trial, he
entered two pleas, one of not guilty and another of not
guilty by reason of insanity (NGI).  Under California
law, when these two pleas are entered, the court must
hold a bifurcated trial, guilt determined during the first
phase and the viability of the defendant’s NGI plea dur-
ing the second.  Mirzayance sought to avoid a first-de-
gree murder conviction during the guilt phase of
Mirzayance’s trial and presented medical testimony that
he was insane at the time of the crime.  The jury still
convicted Mirzayance of first-degree murder.  On the
advice of his counsel, Mirzayance abandoned his NGI
plea because he would have borne the burden of proving
his insanity to the same jury that had just convicted him
of first-degree murder.  After the court sentenced Mirza-
yance, he challenged the conviction, claiming ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
The California trial court denied the petition and
the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that
the state court had unreasonably applied clearly estab-
lished case law that defense counsel’s failure to pursue
the insanity defense constituted deficient performance. 
decision: 
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit judgment and remanded the
case with instructions to deny the petition, ruling that
the California’s decision to deny Mirzayance’s claim did
not violate clearly established federal law.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may
not grant a state prisoner’s habeas application unless the
relevant state-court decision “was contrary to, or in-
volved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States.”  In its ruling, the Court rejected
the Ninth Circuit analysis that Mirzayance had “nothing
to lose” in pursuing his NGI defense and concluded that
federal law never established such a standard.  Instead,
the Court ruled that habeas relief may only be granted
if the state court decision unreasonably applied the in-
effective-assistance-of-counsel standard established by
Strickland, which holds that a defendant must show de-
ficient performance and prejudice.   
The Court found that Mirzayance’s ineffective-
assistance claim failed because it was reasonable for the
state court to conclude Mirzayance’s defense counsel’s
performance was not deficient.  When Mirzayance’s at-
torney advised him to abandon the NGI claim, the attor-
ney did so because he believed his client stood almost
no chance of success.  The Court noted that it has never
required defense counsel to pursue every claim or de-
fense, regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic
chance for success.  Accordingly, the Court found
Mirzayance’s attorney did not violate the Strickland
standard.
556 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: May 2009
question Presented:
Must an indigent defendant affirmatively accept
the appointment of counsel in order to preclude future
police interrogation without an attorney present?
Facts:
Jesse Montejo was charged with first-degree
murder and the court ordered that an attorney be ap-
pointed for Montejo.  Later that day, the police advised
Montejo of his Miranda rights and asked Montejo to ac-
company them in locating the murder weapon.  Montejo
agreed. Neither Montejo, nor the police officers, were
aware that Montejo had been appointed an attorney.
During the search for the weapon, at the suggestion of
one of the detectives, Montejo wrote an inculpatory let-
ter of apology to the victim’s widow.   Upon returning
to the police station, Montejo finally met his court-ap-
pointed attorney.  At trial, his letter was admitted over
defense objection, and he was convicted and sentenced
to death. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that,
although Montejo had been appointed counsel at the
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preliminary hearing, Montejo had not affirmatively re-
quested counsel or invoked any of his Miranda rights,
and, therefore, the letter was admissible. 
decision:
In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court overruled
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), a case hold-
ing that law enforcement must refrain from interrogating
suspects once they have invoked their right to counsel
at a preliminary hearing.  The Court found Jackson un-
workable because, in some jurisdictions, counsel is au-
tomatically appointed to indigent suspects, while other
jurisdictions require suspects to formally request coun-
sel before they are appointed an attorney.  The Court ex-
plained that suspects are afforded sufficient Fifth and
Sixth Amendment protections.  Accordingly, the appro-
priate analysis is not whether or not the suspect was ap-
pointed counsel, but whether or not officers provided
the suspect with his Miranda warnings and whether the
suspect invoked those rights. 
Although the Court found that the Louisiana
Supreme Court correctly rejected Montejo’s claim under
Jackson, the Court remanded the lower court’s decision
in order to provide Montejo an opportunity to contend
that his letter of apology should still have been sup-
pressed on other grounds.
Justices Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, filed
a concurring opinion, noting that the Court was entitled
to reject the doctrine of stare decisis and overturn Jack-
son because Jackson was poorly reasoned.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that
Jackson was not poorly reasoned and did not need to be
overturned.  
Justice Breyer filed a separate dissenting opin-
ion, taking exception to the dissent’s concession that
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) should have
been overturned.
555 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: January 2009
questions Presented:
For qualified immunity purposes, may police of-
ficers enter a home without a warrant on the theory that
the owner consented to entry by previously permitting
an undercover informant into the home?
Should the Court should overrule Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), a case holding that a quali-
fied immunity challenge must pass a two-pronged test:
first, the facts alleged must show that the government
official(s) violated a constitutional right, and second that
constitutional right was clearly established?
Facts:
An informant for the Central Utah Narcotics
Task Force arranged to buy methamphetamine from
Afton Callahan.  The informant arrived at respondent’s
residence, confirmed Callahan had methamphetamine,
and then left Callahan’s home to obtain money. Police
officers gave the informant a marked $100 bill and a
concealed electronic transmitter on the informant’s per-
son.  Callahan’s daughter let the informant into the home
while Callahan retrieved a large bag containing metham-
phetamine from his freezer and sold the informant a
gram of methamphetamine.  Then the informant gave
an “arrest” signal, and law enforcement entered the
home through a porch door.  The officers conducted a
protective sweep of the premises, recovering the large
bag of methamphetamine, the marked bill, the small bag
containing methamphetamine from the informant, and
drug syringes.  Callahan was charged with the unlawful
possession and distribution of methamphetamine.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Callahan sued the po-
lice officers for conducting a warrantless search.  The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity,
finding that a reasonable police officer would have
known not to proceed into the home without a search
warrant.
decision:
Justice Alito delivered the Court’s unanimous
opinion holding the Saucier protocol should not be re-
garded as mandatory in all cases and concluded the of-
ficers were entitled to qualified immunity.  The Court
revisited the doctrine of qualified immunity protecting
government officials “from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known,” as declared in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) and
Saucier, 533 U.S. 194.  Under Saucier the Supreme
Court mandated a two-step procedure for resolving
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whether government officials’ qualify for immunity.
The procedure requires courts to first decide whether the
plaintiff has alleged facts that constitute a violation of a
constitutional right.  If the first step is satisfied, then the
court must decide whether the right at issue was “clearly
established” at the time of government official’s alleged
misconduct. 
Reviewing the consequences of Saucier, the
Court determined that the imposition of the Saucier rule
requires courts to depart from the general rule of con-
stitutional avoidance, creates unnecessary litigation of
constitutional issues, wastes the parties’ and judicial re-
sources when such litigation has no effect on the out-
come of the case, and fails to contribute to the
development of constitutional law because of the fact-
intensive nature of the cases.  Upon this reflection the
Court held that, although the Saucier procedure is often
appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as manda-
tory.  The Court concluded that district court and appel-
late court judges should be permitted to exercise
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.
Applying this rational, the Court concluded that because
these officers relied on the “consent-once-removed”
doctrine, which had gained acceptance in the lower
courts, the officers did not violate clearly established
law and are entitled to qualified immunity.
556 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: March 2009
question Presented:
Does an erroneous denial of a criminal defen-
dant’s peremptory challenge, resulting in the challenged
juror being seated, require automatic reversal of a con-
viction?
Facts:
During jury selection in Michael Rivera’s first-
degree murder trial, his counsel sought to use a peremp-
tory challenge to strike a female venire member.
However, Rivera had already exercised two peremptory
challenges against women, one of whom was African-
American. Believing Rivera was discriminating against
women, the trial court rejected the third peremptory
challenge.  Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), parties are constitutionally prohibited from ex-
ercising peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based
on race, ethnicity, or sex.  At trial, the challenged juror
was appointed the jury foreperson and the jury found
Rivera guilty of first-degree murder. 
On appeal, Rivera challenged the trial court’s re-
jection of his peremptory challenge.  The Supreme
Court of Illinois held that the peremptory challenge
should have been allowed, but that the error was harm-
less.
decision: 
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
lower decision, holding that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not require reversal
whenever a criminal defendant’s peremptory challenge
is erroneously denied.  The Court emphasized that it has
never held a freestanding constitutional right to peremp-
tory challenges, referring to it as a “creature of statute.”
Rejecting Rivera’s argument, the Court held that if a de-
fendant is tried before a qualified jury composed of in-
dividuals not challengeable for cause, then the loss of a
peremptory challenge due to a state court’s good-faith
error is not a matter of federal constitutional concern.
The Court concluded the trial judge’s refusal to excuse
the challenged juror did not deprive Rivera of his con-
stitutional right to a fair trial.  The record did not show
that the trial judge repeatedly or deliberately misapplied
the law or acted in an arbitrary or irrational manner.  In-
stead, the record demonstrated the trial judge’s effort to
enforce the anti-discrimination requirements of Batson.
556 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: March 2009
question Presented:
Do delays caused by public defenders, or result-
ing from a state’s system of public defense, deprive a
criminal defendant of his right to a speedy trial?
Facts:
On July 27, 2001, police arrested Michael Bril-
lon for assaulting his girlfriend. Three days later he was
arraigned in a vermont state court and charged with
felony domestic assault.  The day of the arraignment,




defender as Brillon’s first attorney. In October, the pub-
lic defender filed a motion to recuse the trial judge.
After a month, the motion was denied.  In mid-January,
the public defender moved for a continuance and the
trial court denied the motion.  On February 22, four days
before the jury draw, the public defender again moved
for a continuance.  When the trial court denied the mo-
tion, Brillon asked the public defender be dismissed as
his counsel and the court granted the motion.  That same
day, the trial court appointed a second attorney, but the
second attorney immediately withdrew based on a con-
flict.  On March 1, 2002, the court assigned Brillon a
third attorney.  On May 20, Brillon filed a motion to dis-
miss the third attorney for failure to file motions and
lack of communication.  On June 11, the third attorney
moved to withdraw himself on the ground that Brillon
had threatened his life.  That same day, the trial court
appointed a fourth attorney.  Two months later, Brillon
filed a motion to dismiss the fourth attorney.  At a No-
vember 26 hearing, the fourth attorney reported that his
contract with the Defender General’s office had expired
several months prior and that he was attempting to have
Brillon’s case reassigned.  On January 15, 2003 the de-
fender’s office appointed Brillon’s fifth attorney.  The
fifth attorney sought an extension for discovery dead-
lines on February 25.  However, on April 10, the fifth
attorney withdrew from the case based on contract mod-
ifications with the Defender General.  On August 1,
2003, the Defender’s Office appointed a sixth attorney
for Brillon.  On February 23, 2004, Brillon filed a mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, but the trial
court denied the motion. 
The case finally went to trial on June 14, 2004.
The jury found Brillon guilty and he was sentenced to
12 to 20 years in prison.  The vermont Supreme Court
vacated defendant’s conviction and held that he had
been denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
decision:
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the vermont Supreme Court’s decision,
holding that the vermont Supreme Court erred in con-
sidering Brillon’s assigned counsel as state actors be-
cause assigned counsel, just as retained counsel, act on
behalf of their clients, and delays sought by counsel are
ordinarily attributable to the defendants they represent.
Noting that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy
trial is dependent upon circumstances, the Court attrib-
uted most of the delays to the defendant’s dismissal of
counsel. Referring to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972), which established a balancing test in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed, the Court highlighted several factors in deter-
mining whether a delay constitutes a deprivation of a
speedy trial: length of delay, reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and
prejudice to the defendant.  The Court found that most
of the delays in Brillon’s trial were attributable to him.
Accordingly, the Court concluded, absent defendant’s
deliberate efforts to force the withdrawal of his prior
counsel, no speedy-trial issue would have arisen. 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens dis-
sented, arguing that there was no convincing reason to
find error in the vermont Supreme Court decision.  In
overturning Brillon’s conviction, the vermont Supreme
Court, the dissent argued, properly attributed time
against the state. 
558 U.S. ___ (2009)
decided: November 2009
question Presented:
Is an individual deprived of effective assistance
of counsel where counsel failed to present mitigating
evidence regarding that individual’s background, char-
acter, mental state, and positive prison adjustment?
Facts:
While committing a burglary, Fernando Bel-
montes clubbed Steacy McConnell to death with a steel
dumbbell bar.  Belmontes struck her 15-20 times in the
head until she died and then he stole her stereo.  A jury
convicted Belmontes of murder and he was sentenced
to death. 
At the sentencing hearing, Belmontes’s defense
attorney elicited testimony from nine witnesses about
Blemontes’s difficult childhood and religious conver-
sion. As a strategy decision, Belmontes’s attorney re-
fused to elicit any other character evidence because the
attorney did not want to open the door for the prosecu-
tion to discuss a prior murder in which Belmontes was
found, after the fact, to be an accessory. 
Belmontes argued that, because his counsel did
not investigate and present sufficient mitigating evi-
dence, he was deprived of effective assistance of coun-
sel. The court of appeals agreed and granted Belmontes




The Supreme Court held that Belmontes was not
deprived of effective assistance of counsel.  Upholding
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the
Court concluded that, to show ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must establish that defense coun-
sel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and prejudice.   The Court found that
Belmontes’s attorney understood the gravity of Bel-
montes’s conduct in the prior murder and formed his
strategy to prevent “opening of the door.”  The Court
weighed how a jury would react to all the mitigating ev-
idence in light of the aggravating evidence. The Court
concluded that Belmontes’s attorney submitted suffi-
cient mitigating character evidence.
557 U.S. ___ (2009)
decision: June 2009
question Presented:
Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, may the
government retry acquitted defendants on factually re-
lated counts when the jury failed to reach a verdict?
Facts:
Scott Yeager, a former Enron executive, was
charged with wire fraud, securities fraud, insider trading,
money laundering, and conspiracy to engage in securi-
ties fraud and wire fraud.  At trial the government tried
to show that Yeager defrauded Enron investors and
shareholders by purposely making misrepresentations
and material omissions about revenues, business per-
formance, and technological capabilities.  The jury ac-
quitted Yeager on several securities and wire fraud
counts, but deadlocked on the remaining counts.  The
government subsequently recharged Yeager for insider
trading and money laundering offenses.
Yeager moved to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds. This district court denied the motion and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
decision: 
In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that an apparent
inconsistency between acquittals on some counts and a
jury’s failure to return a verdict on other factually related
counts does not diminish the acquittals’ potential issue-
preclusive force under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Relying on Ashe v. Swenson 397 U.S. 436 (1970), which
precludes the government from retrying any crimes that
have as a necessary element any issue that was already
decided in a prior acquittal, the Court explained that, in
identifying which issues a jury had previously conclu-
sively determined, courts should look only to the jury’s
decisions rather than its failures to decide.  In other
words, “a jury speaks only through its verdict” because
hung counts are unavoidably inscrutable.  The Court
concluded the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on the
insider trading counts were a “nonevent,” entitled to no
weight.  The Court concluded that if the acquittal of in-
sider trading was a critical issue of ultimate fact of all
the other charges, then the prosecution would be barred
from recharging on the other counts. 
Justice Kennedy filed a separate concurring
opinion, expressing that the Court should have required
the lower court to revisit the factual analysis, rather than
making it optional.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and
Justice Alito dissented, arguing that the Double Jeop-
ardy clause can have no preclusive effect within the
same proceeding.  There must be a separate prosecution
altogether.  
Justice Alito authored another separate dissent, to which
Justices Thomas and Scalia joined, arguing that an ac-
quittal should only have preclusive effect when it would






Does the lack of any explicit advice stating that
a suspect has the right to counsel during questioning vi-
olate Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)?
Facts:
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Florida v. Powell
Kevin Powell was convicted of felony in posses-
sion of a firearm.  When Powell was arrested and taken
to the police department for questioning, the police re-
cited to Powell, “You have the right to remain silent.  If
you give up this right to remain silent, anything you say
can be used against you in court.  You have the right to
talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions.
If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be ap-
pointed for you without cost and before any questioning.
You have the right to use any of these rights at any time
you want during this interview.”  Powell subsequently
waived his rights.  Powell appealed his conviction argu-
ing that he was not did not explicitly notified that he had
a right to an attorney “during” his questioning, and
therefore the questioning violated Miranda.  The Florida
Supreme Court ultimately reversed the conviction, hold-
ing that being told that an individual has the right to talk




Does the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment prohibit the sentence of life without
the possibility of parole imposed on a juvenile convicted
of a non-homicide offense?
Facts:
Terrance Graham was convicted of armed bur-
glary and attempted armed robbery at the age of 16.
After serving a 12-month sentence, Graham was ac-
cused of a probation violation for his involvement in an
armed burglary.  At the probation violation hearing, the
judge considered Graham’s violent history and sen-
tenced him to life in prison without parole.  
At the age of thirteen, Joseph Sullivan was con-
victed of burglary and raping an elderly woman.  At sen-
tencing, the state presented evidence that Sullivan had
participated in at least seventeen crimes before the rape
and burglary.  The judge determined that, given Sulli-
van’s violent past, he should be treated as an adult of-
fender and sentenced Sullivan to life in prison without




Is a prior state conviction for “battery,” in all
cases, considered a “violent felony,” even where the
state does not include as an element of the offense the
use or threatened use of physical force?
Facts:
Curtis Johnson pleaded guilty to a single federal
charge of possession of ammunition as a convicted
felon.  Johnson had several previous felony state con-
victions for aggravated battery, burglary, and battery.
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-
year mandatory minimum sentence for an individual
convicted under the act who also has three prior convic-
tions for “violent felonies.”   Under ACCA, Johnson was
subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence.  The
district court sentenced him to 185 months of imprison-
ment.  On appeal the Florida Supreme Court overturned
the sentence, ruling that battery did not constitute a vi-
olent felony because the use of force was not an element
of the crime.  The Eleventh Circuit reversed, upholding




Is Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981),
which prohibits interrogation of a suspect who has in-
voked the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, still appli-
cable when the interrogation continues after a
substantial delay from when the suspect requested coun-
sel?
Facts:
In 2006, Michael Shatzer, Sr., was charged with
a sexual offense in the second degree, sexual child abuse
by a parent, second degree assault, and contributing to
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conditions rendering a child in need of assistance.  In
August 2003, a police officer received a referral from a
social worker about a child sexual abuse case.  After in-
terviewing the child, the police officer contacted Shatzer
in jail where he was being held on a sex-offense charge
involving a different victim.  At the outset of the inter-
rogation, the police officer notified Shatzer he was an
officer and read him his Miranda rights.  Shatzer in-
voked his right to counsel and the interview ceased.  In
March of 2006, a different police officer, investigating
the same case, visited Shatzer in jail and read Shatzer
his Miranda rights.  Shatzer signed the form and agreed
to talk with the officer.  During this interrogation,
Schatzer never invoked his right to an attorney. 
At trial, Schatzer moved to suppress the confession, ar-
guing that he had invoked his right to counsel three
years prior to the 2006 interrogation.  The trial court de-
nied the motion.  On appeal, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that Edwards applies when a
suspect has been continually incarcerated and previously
invoked his right to counsel.
08-651
question Presented:
Does the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effec-
tive assistance of counsel require an attorney to advise
a non-citizen client that a guilty plea will trigger manda-
tory deportation, and if so, does it warrant setting aside
the guilty plea?
Facts:
Jose Padilla, a non-citizen, was charged with
trafficking and possessing marijuana, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and operating a tractor without a weight
and distance tax number.  Relying on advice from his
attorney, Padilla pleaded guilty to the drug charges.
Padilla’s guilty plea and subsequent conviction triggered
deportation proceedings.  Padilla filed for post-convic-
tion relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
the conviction.  The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed,
holding that collateral consequences of attorneys’ advice




Can a prosecutor, who procured false testimony
during an investigation and then introduced the testi-
mony against a defendant at trial, be subjected to a civil
trial and potential damages for a wrongful conviction
and incarceration?
Facts:
In 1978, Curtis McGhee Jr. was tried and con-
victed for the murder of an Iowa police officer.  The
Iowa Supreme Court vacated Harrington’s conviction in
2003, after becoming aware that the prosecutors failed
to disclose exculpatory evidence of an alternative sus-
pect.  In 2005, McGhee sued the prosecutors under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the prosecutors had coerced
false testimony from witnesses and intentionally with-
held exculpatory evidence of an alternative suspect.
The trial court granted Pottawattamie County’s
motion for summary judgment based on absolute and
qualified immunity.  The Seventh Circuit held that a
prosecutor’s procurement of false testimony, without
more, does not violate any of a criminal defendant’s
constitutional rights.  McGhee appealed to the Eighth
Circuit under the collateral order doctrine.  The Eighth
Circuit reversed, holding that a prosecutor has no im-
munity “where the prosecutor was accused of both fab-
ricating evidence and then using the fabricated evidence




Did the Sixth Circuit contravene the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act by improperly ex-
tending Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), which
held that, in capital cases, jurors may not be precluded
from considering any mitigating circumstances prof-




Pottawattamie County v. McGhee
Facts:
Frank Spisak was convicted of three murders in
1983.  At the sentencing hearing, the trial court in-
structed the jury that if they all found proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances in
each separate count outweighed the mitigating factors,
then they must return that finding to the court.  Spisak
was subsequently sentenced to death. 
However, the Sixth Circuit reversed and re-
manded the conviction, finding ineffective assistance of
counsel and a Mills violation because the jury instruc-
tions required unanimity in the finding that the aggra-
vating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case in light of Carey v.
Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006) and Schriro v. Landrigan,
550 U.S. 465 (2007), two cases which addressed
Spisak’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. On re-




Is 18 U.S.C. § 48, criminalizing, inter alia,
“knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the
intention of placing those depictions in interstate com-
merce for commercial gain” facially invalid under the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
Facts:
Robert Stevens was convicted of selling videos
of pit bulls participating in dog fights and attacking
other animals through his business, “Dogs of velvet and
Steel” and a website called Pitbulllife.com.  Stevens
moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the
federal statute violates the Free Speech Clause, but the
district court denied the motion.  On appeal, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, find-
ing that the statute was facially unconstitutional as a




Did the state court err in its application of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act when the
state court determined that it was not ineffective assis
tance of counsel for a defendant’s novice attorney failure
to present available evidence of the defendant’s severely
impaired mental functioning?
Facts:
In 1994, Mr. Holly Wood was convicted capital
murder for killing his former girlfriend in her home.  Ev-
idence showed that Wood had an IQ within the range of
mental retardation.  At sentencing, Wood’s attorney, who
had just recently been admitted to the bar, only at-
tempted to mitigate by eliciting pleas of mercy from
Wood’s family members, testimony about his upbring-
ing, a police report that indicated he had been drinking
at the time of his arrest, and a parole board report re-
marking that Wood needed anger-management therapy.
The novice attorney made no attempt to introduce evi-
dence of mental retardation, and had not attempted to
investigate Wood’s mental handicaps.  The jury sen-
tenced Wood death.
Both the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
and sentence, finding that the attorney’s decision not to
introduce evidence of mental retardation was a strategic
decision.  Wood subsequently filed for relief in federal
courts.  The federal district court granted relief, conclud-
ing that it was an unreasonable determination that the
attorney’s failure to introduce evidence was a strategic
decision.  The Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding
that there was ample evidence for the state courts to de-
termine that the decision was a strategic move.
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